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Abstract 
Current research shows that female legislators serve as role models for women. Understudied is 
how and the extent to which female ministers inspire women to participate in politics. We argue 
that with their high visibility and greater ability to influence policy, female ministers also serve 
as role models, but their influence differs depending on the form of political engagement. Using 
the World Values Survey and additional national-level variables, we employ multilevel modeling 
techniques to explore how women in the cabinet influence various forms of women’s political 
engagement. We find that the proportion of women in the cabinet has a stronger effect on 
participation than the proportion of women in parliament. All else being equal, a higher 
proportion of women in the cabinet increases women’s conventional participation (voting and 
party membership), petition signing, and engagement in peaceful demonstrations, but it does not 
influence women’s participation in strikes or boycotts. Our findings add to current studies of 
women’s political representation, in which ministerial representation is often underexplored or 
not differentiated from parliamentary representation, and help distinguish various forms of 
participation. Future research should consider examining a wider variety of women’s political 
roles in other areas of the political arena. 
 Political representation is considered important in democracies because it establishes the 
legitimacy of political institutions and helps governments respond to their citizens (Dovi 2014). 
In recent years, the inclusion of women in political institutions is also recognized to encourage 
civic engagement among citizens (Barnes and Burchard 2012; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; 
Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Pearson and Dancey 2011; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). 
However, in exploring this effect of representation, most scholars focus on women’s legislative 
presence, although descriptive representation could be important in many places in the polity. In 
particular, evidence suggests that increasing numbers of women in cabinets or executives have 
substantial impact on the political office and policy making (Borelli 2002; Davis 1997; Reynolds 
1999). Yet women’s presence in the legislature is not necessarily predictive of representation in 
the cabinet. While it is reasonable to assume that female legislators might be similar in several 
ways to female ministers, in many countries, clear differences exist between these two groups. 
Female legislators, overall, still have few opportunities to become members of cabinets despite 
the increased presence of women in cabinets, although this is less true in some Latin American 
countries (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson 2005). 
This article examines the relative influence of female ministers compared with women in 
parliament on citizens’ civic engagement, focusing particularly on how distinctions in the two 
types of representation have differential effects on political participation. We categorize political 
activity by how conventional the action is, based on its costs, risks, and connections to electoral 
institutions, when evaluating the influence of female cabinet members on civic engagement. We 
begin by discussing the role model effect and its impact on citizens’ participation. We then 
compare women’s representation with that in the cabinet. Next, we theorize how differences 
between legislative and ministerial representation might result in differential effects on the 
 distinctive forms of political participation. After presenting our hypotheses and describing our 
data and methods, we present and interpret our findings. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of these findings for future research. 
 
HOW WOMEN IN POLITICAL OFFICE INCREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The lack of gender equality in political leadership remains a fundamental problem, as women 
continue to be largely underrepresented in legislatures and cabinets (Schwindt-Bayer and 
Mishler 2005). According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2015), on average worldwide, 
women constitute 22.1% of upper and lower legislative houses combined. The percentage of 
women in lower houses also varies extensively among democracies, ranging from 63.8% in 
Rwanda to 0% in several countries. The dearth of women’s political representation raises 
concerns about how such a deficiency affects citizens. Mansbridge (1999), for example, suggests 
that without descriptive representation, communication with officials by underrepresented 
citizens might be impaired by a lack of attention from elected officials or feelings of distrust 
among citizens. She notes that the absence of descriptive representation might make the 
underrepresented feel like second-class citizens or decrease the legitimacy of the polity for 
excluded groups. Other authors also find that descriptive representation affects disadvantaged 
groups’ ability to express their opinions and participate in politics (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and 
Carillo 2007; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). 
Women’s descriptive representation can have four specific effects on women’s political 
participation. First, increases in women’s descriptive representation may alter women’s 
perceptions of the political system. In a system in which they see few women represented, 
women may perceive the system as not welcoming women or interpret that women do not have 
 the characteristics that lead to success in that particular arena. Thus, increased representation of 
women serves as an indicator that politics is not just a “man’s game” (Verba, Burns, and 
Schlozman1997). That is, the inclusion of women in high elected office signals that women can 
and should be participants in the political process (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Carroll 
1994; Reingold 2000). This may be one way that women’s descriptive representation in the 
United States and cross-nationally, defined either by a female candidate running for office or by 
the percentage of women in a country’s legislature, inspires women, particularly girls, who are 
still in the political socialization stage, to participate more in politics (Campbell and Wolbrecht 
2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). 
Similarly, the example of successful female politicians, like women leaders in other 
professions (see e.g. Marx and Roman 2002; Nixon and Robinson 1999), is particularly 
necessary to indicate to other women that there are opportunities for success in politics, as 
women tend to lack political ambition (Fox and Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005, 
2015). Specifically, the findings on the gender gap in the emergence of political candidates in 
Fox and Lawless’s studies (Fox and Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005, 2015) suggest 
that the lack of political ambition explains why women are less likely to run for political seats. 
As women are reported to have lower self-confidence and fewer aspirations to run for political 
office, female role models in the political arena may be particularly crucial in increasing 
women’s political ambition, which may, in turn, transform into actual forms of political 
participation. As enhanced descriptive representation may lead women to see opportunities for 
success in political action, women may be more likely to engage in politics under the exposure of 
female political leaders. Thus, increased descriptive representation may lead women to see 
opportunities for success in political action. 
 Furthermore, the positive impact of female legislators on the likelihood of placing 
women’s issues on the agenda as well as their support for women-related policies helps explain 
why increasing representation among women in office might lead to increases in women’s 
political participation. Female legislators have been tied to substantive changes in policies for 
women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson 2006, 2008; Kathlene 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2010;). 
Women’s recognition of the substantive influence of female politicians may lead them to believe 
that political participation by citizens could also have such a substantive effect. In these 
circumstances, their feelings of political efficacy are likely to increase (Celis and Childs 2008; 
Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2008; Fox and Lawless 2014; Kittleson 2005) and they will 
be inspired to increase their own political engagement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), 
suggesting that women legislators have a significant impact on women’s political activism 
through their activities for women. 
Finally, it is also likely that when women hold powerful positions in the chamber that the 
institution itself is transformed by the incorporation of women’s viewpoints in a way that 
fundamentally alters the political institution (Hawkesworth 2003; see, e.g., Borelli on the 
regendering of the executive branch). Such regendering of the institution may create political 
institutions that are more attractive, and therefore more welcoming, to individual women 
citizens. Increased representation might lead to changes in institutional norms or practices that 
are more women friendly. These changes may, for example, lead to different management styles 
or organizational philosophies that are more welcoming to women (McGlenn and Sarkees 1997). 
Thus, increasing women’s representation may alter the characteristics of the political institution 
itself. 
The mechanisms described here, however, are not specific to representation in national 
 legislatures, although empirical studies of the role model effect on political participation have 
focused on women in the legislature. Women’s representation in other democratic institutions 
may provide the visibility needed to be a role model for individual citizens; the substantive effect 
on policy that might inspire political action; and the ability to regender political institutions that 
might make them more welcoming to women. Indeed, women in political office are only likely 
to serve as role models or create a substantive effect that inspires action by others to the extent 
that they are visible enough to be noticed by ordinary citizens in the first place. 
We argue that, in fact, this is as likely to occur when women are in cabinet positions as in 
legislatures because female cabinet ministers are highly visible. There are a number of examples 
of cabinet ministers who both achieved visibility in their countries and substantively influenced 
policy on women’s issues. Adriana Delpiano, who has held numerous ministerial positions in 
Chile, has focused on issues of domestic violence against women. Tanya Plibersek, who also 
held ministerial positions in Australia, is another example of a high-profile cabinet member who 
has devoted much attention to women’s issues. During her terms, she initiated policies that 
tackled domestic violence against women and approved abortion drugs. To examine further how 
women’s representation in the cabinet might have a different influence on citizens’ political 
participation, we consider how ministerial representation compares with legislative 
representation in the next section. 
 
Female Political Leaders in Legislatures and Cabinets 
The research mentioned earlier relies heavily on women’s presence in legislatures (Inglehart and 
Norris 2003; Karp and Banducci 2008; Kittilson 2006; McDonagh 2009; Norris and Lovenduski 
1993; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). 
 Nonetheless, we argue that elected ministerial representation is also likely to engender greater 
political participation. To understand why, we focus on the three distinctions between elected 
legislative representation and appointed ministerial representation, which might lead descriptive 
representation in these areas to have divergent implications for women citizens’ political 
participation: the degree to which women citizens are represented, the pathways to the two types 
of political offices, and the responsibilities that each type of representative assumes (Annesley et 
al. 2012). 
First, while gender inequality in the national legislature is prevalent across democracies, 
women’s descriptive representation in the cabinet does not always mimic their representation in 
the legislature. Table 1 shows that women, although constituting half of the population, do not 
hold half of the positions in either parliament or the cabinet. Most, but not all, countries have a 
higher presence of women in the cabinet than in parliament. Nonetheless, those countries with 
the highest proportion of women in parliament are not necessarily the ones with the highest 
proportion of women in the cabinet, suggesting that the proportion of women in the legislature is 
not necessarily a proxy for the level of women’s representation throughout government. For 
example, in 2009 in the countries included in the World Values Survey (WVS), the share of 
women in parliaments ranged from 8% to 46% and the share of women in cabinets ranged from 
5% to 48%. Within these countries, however, representation in the cabinet and the parliament 
was not equal. In Chile, for example, women were well represented in the cabinet in 2009 (43%) 
but not well represented in parliament (14%), while in Pakistan, women made up a higher 
proportion of the parliament (22%) than of the cabinet (5%). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Second, the eligibility pools for legislators and ministers are also distinctive, affecting the 
 visibility of these two groups of representatives. According to Annesley et al. (2012), there are 
essentially two ways for women to be elected as ministers. First, elected parliamentarians who 
belong to the party or parties that constitute the government, with a few exceptions, are eligible 
for ministerial positions. The process of becoming a candidate for a parliamentary seat is already 
one that requires resources and support from party elites (Fox and Lawless 2010; Norris and 
Lovenduski 1993). In those systems in which the cabinet is drawn from members of parliament, 
additional resources and patronage of party elites are required to enter the cabinet. Members of 
the cabinet are either the leader of their own party or appointed by these party leaders and are 
usually highly visible within their party organization (Krook and O’Brien 2012; Warwick and 
Druckman 2006). As a result, they are more likely to be known to the public than the average 
members of parliament before taking ministerial positions. Second, in some countries, cabinet 
officials may also come from outside a party’s representation in parliament. Much like the 
members of parliament chosen for these positions, the women chosen from outside parliament 
for these positions are already highly visible in their countries (Annesley and Gains 2010; 
Annesley et al. 2012). Consequently, female ministers as a whole are likely to be better known 
and more visible to citizens than their counterparts who are elected to parliament. 
Even when female cabinet ministers are not highly visible prior to their entry into the 
cabinet, the limited size of most cabinets and the small number of cabinet ministers placed at the 
head of parts of the bureaucracy increase a woman politician’s visibility. For example, Angela 
Merkel, the current German chancellor, was in her first term in the German Bundestag and had 
little political experience when she was appointed minister of women and youth (Wiliarty 2008). 
During the period she served in this position, an intense debate around the creation of a single 
abortion law for East and West Germany made her an important spokesperson on women’s 
 issues. While she served as minister of the environment, large and heavily publicized 
demonstrations against the transportation of nuclear waste through Germany also raised her 
visibility. The media attention that Merkel received during her tenure in both offices helped her 
move from a relatively unknown politician to a leader within the Christian Democratic Union 
(Steckenrider 2013). We argue that the increased visibility of these previously unknown women 
that came with their ministerial positions and their success in office likely inspire women to be 
politically engaged (Atkeson 2003). 
Third, the responsibilities of legislators and ministers also vary, although both legislators 
and ministers create policy, oversee the execution of those policies, and must be responsible to 
constituents. In the area of policy creation, cabinet members usually have the power to determine 
the implementation of regulations and often initiate legislation in their portfolio area. In contrast, 
a member of parliament’s power to do either of these things is much more circumscribed, 
although members of parliament may use their individual powers in a wider array of policy areas 
than a cabinet minister holding a specific portfolio. Consequently, cabinet members’ 
responsibilities in the first two areas are more extensive in terms of the power to influence policy 
as well as visibility to citizens. An example of this occurred during Michelle Bachelet’s term as 
minister of health in Chile, during which time she introduced a commission to examine ways of 
reforming the health care system to create more gender equity (Ewig 2008). She also issued a 
regulation expanding access to emergency contraception that considerably altered the discussion 
around reproductive rights (Franceschet 2010). Consequently, female ministers have more 
extensive powers to initiate policies than members of parliament, although these powers are 
limited to their particular portfolio. Many political decisions are ultimately made and approved 
by individual cabinet members, while individual legislators are rarely so clearly tied to specific 
 substantive areas. 
In sum, women in the cabinet are, on average, likely to have more power to affect policy 
and greater visibility than their counterparts in the legislature. If the role model effect is based on 
visibility, on average, cabinet ministers should be more likely to inspire increased political 
participation than elected members of the national parliament. If the role model effect is 
influenced by seeing women as political actors that create substantive change, women cabinet 
members—as high-ranking state officials and as heads of particular parts of the national 
bureaucracy—should affect citizen participation more than their female counterparts in the 
legislature. To understand how this affects specific types of political participation, however, we 
first need to discuss the different ways that citizens participate in the polity. 
 
Variation in the Forms of Political Participation 
In previous explorations of the role model effect, measures of citizens’ political participation 
have varied in a number of ways. Some utilize measures that involve low-cost aspects of 
behavior such as political interest, political trust, or political knowledge (Karp and Banducci 
2008; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Zetterberg 2009). Others focus on more costly 
engagement in electoral politics such as voting, working in a campaign, making a campaign 
contribution, joining a political organization, or contacting a government official or party leader 
(Barnes and Burchard 2012; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Desposato and Norrander 
2009; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). Some scholars have even employed measures of 
participation that focus on highly costly acts that are not necessarily connected to electoral 
institutions such as boycotting or demonstrating (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). The foregoing 
discussion of the mechanisms by which women in government positions influence citizen 
 participation suggests the need to consider the specific forms that political participation takes. 
Political participation, originally equated with voting, is now better conceptualized as 
civic engagement. Conceptualizations of civic engagement vary from a range of activities related 
to electoral politics (Dalton 2008) to feminist definitions that recognize informal activities in the 
private sphere (see e.g. Lister 2003, 145–47). Although we are constrained by the use of existing 
surveys, we measure political action as broadly as possible by including both conventional 
(electoral politics related) and unconventional forms of political action—defined as boycotts and 
strikes—as well as activities that lie between the two. Particularly, we consider petition signing 
and peaceful demonstrations as borderline actions because they can be incorporated into both 
electoral politics and activities outside of or opposed to electoral politics. Table 2 illustrates the 
distinctions we see between these different forms of behavior position. As each specific form of 
political involvement varies by its type of influence, scope of outcome, conflict level, initiative 
required, cooperation with others, and connections with electoral institutions (Dalton 2008; 
Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978), we expect the effect of women’s presence in political institutions on 
individuals’ use of each form of political action to differ. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Conventional electoral political action, such as voting and being a member of a political 
party, is closely related to electoral institutions. While both members of parliament and members 
of government are tied to electoral politics, ministers are generally more visible, making them 
more likely to influence women citizens’ activities. Moreover, because ministers are highly 
engaged in electoral politics—both through their own selection and as part of their jobs—we 
expect that an increasing the proportion of female ministers encourages women to participate in 
conventional politics, specifically, voting and obtaining political party membership. 
 H1: Holding all else constant, as the proportion of women in the cabinet increases, so 
does the likelihood of women engaging in conventional electoral political action (voting 
and obtaining political party membership). 
Petition signing is another form of political participation that allows individuals to 
convey their preferences to elected representatives. Although petitions need not be part of normal 
electoral politics petition signing has increasingly become connected to electoral institutions over 
the last few decades.1 While petition signing might also be utilized to target industries and 
corporations, reducing its connection with electoral institutions, it still serves as a means for 
individuals to communicate with elected leaders. Particularly, petition signing allows for very 
clear messages to be conveyed as each petition is aimed at a specific issue or policy. Moreover, 
the difficulty and costs associated with petitioning have decreased in recent years. Online 
activism, which has increased dramatically in recent years, has made petition signing a relatively 
effortless endeavor, enhancing individuals’ participation in petition signing (Earl and Kimport 
2009; Earl et al. 2010; Kahne et al. 2014; Maguth 2012). To the extent that women in the cabinet 
increase female citizens’ efficacy and sense of representation through policy making, we expect 
women to be encouraged to sign petitions to express their concerns as the presence of female 
ministers rises. 
H2: All else being equal, the higher the proportion of female ministers, the more likely it 
is that women will be willing to sign petitions. 
The linkage between lawful demonstrations and electoral institutions, however, is not as 
clear. We suspect that there are multiple ways that women’s presence in the cabinet might 
influence this form of political participation. Peaceful demonstrations generally are understood 
as an unconventional form of action requiring more effort, necessitating a higher degree of 
 cooperation (e.g. with other demonstrators) and encompassing more risks to the participant 
(Dalton 2008). Demonstration also traditionally serves as a “political resource of minorities and 
repressed groups” that can be utilized to express political preferences when groups are excluded 
from the political process (Dalton 2008, 63). However, when women are present in official 
political institutions such as the cabinet, female citizens might feel that they can utilize 
conventional outlets, such as voting, to express their opinion. If true, demonstrations are not 
likely to increase when more women are in the cabinet. Moreover, given the policy powers of 
female ministers, women citizens may feel that increased descriptive representation is 
accompanied by increases in substantive representation in policy as well. This might lead female 
citizens to believe they do not need to engage in demonstrations against the government, 
suggesting that the presence of female ministers might even reduce women’s participation in 
peaceful demonstrations. This leads us to hypothesize, 
H3a: All else being equal, an increase in women’s representation in the cabinet leads to a 
decrease or no change in the level of women’s attendance in peaceful demonstration. 
On the other hand, despite the great demand on resources required for organizing 
demonstrations, protest has become more common over the last few decades. Even Dalton now 
defines demonstrations as an “extension of conventional political action” (2008, 91), departing 
from his previous definition in 1988. Indeed, in the United States, female cabinet ministers have 
even participated in demonstrations (Banaszak 2010). To the extent that protest is now a normal 
political activity through which individuals express their political preference and establish 
connections with electoral institutions, we also expect that female ministers to serve as role 
models for this form of women’s participation. 
H3b: All else being equal, the higher the proportion of female ministers, the more willing 
 women will be to participate in peaceful demonstrations. 
We argue that joining a strike or boycotting are different from peacefully demonstrating 
because they involve more costly, potentially illegal, and occasionally violent actions (Dahl and 
Stattin 2014; Dalton 2008; Wolfsfeld et al. 1994). This form of engagement requires more effort 
and coordination than peaceful demonstration and is rarely used to engage in electoral politics. 
The potential for harm to the participants is increased because governments are more likely to 
respond negatively to this behavior. Additionally, strikes and boycotts are usually disconnected 
from the electoral institutions where cabinet ministers’ primary responsibilities and activities lie. 
Boycotts and strikes usually target economic institutions, such as corporations or employers, 
which also are more removed from the electoral institutions, where female ministers serve as role 
models. For this reason, we hypothesize, 
H4: Holding all other factors constant, increasing women’s ministerial representation 
does not lead to an increase in women’s willingness to engage in unconventional 
political action. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We analyze how female ministers shape women’s civic engagement by analyzing individual 
indicators of women’s political participation using Wave 6 of the World Values Survey, which 
was fielded in 2010 and released in 2014.2  These survey data are combined with national-level 
context measures including an indicator of women’s political representation in the cabinet in 
2009 taken from Krook and O’Brien data (2012). All national-level context variables are taken 
from 2009, one year prior to the fielding of the WVS, unless otherwise indicated. Our dataset 
includes citizen surveys and national-level data from 20 democracies: Armenia, Australia, Chile, 
 Colombia, Estonia, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States of America, Uruguay, and 
New Zealand.3 Next, we describe the specific measures in greater detail. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our primary interest is how women engage in multiple forms of political behavior. Specifically, 
we use four dependent variables: conventional action, petition signing, protest participation, and 
unconventional action. Our tests of significance indicate that a gender gap between men and 
women exists across all forms of participation (p <.05). Men participate significantly more than 
women in voting and obtaining party membership, petition signing, attending peaceful 
demonstrations, and boycotting and joining strikes. 
Participation in conventional electoral politics—our first measure of political behavior—
is measured through two types of electoral activity, specifically, how frequently respondents vote 
and their membership in political parties. Respondents are asked about their frequency of voting, 
where 1 = never, 2 = usually, and 3 = always. Respondents are also asked whether they are an 
active member, an inactive member, or not a member of a political party on a scale ranging from 
1 = not a member to 3 = active member. We create an index of conventional action by averaging 
the two measures, that is, by combining voting behavior and party membership. Second, we 
measure respondents’ propensity to sign petitions and their propensity to participate in peaceful 
demonstrations.4 Both measures are based on a single question. Respondents are asked whether 
they have ever signed a petition or attended a peaceful demonstration. Both measures are on a 
scale of 1 = would never do to 3 = have done.  
To operationalize unconventional political participation, we create an index that 
 combines survey questions about each respondent’s willingness to join strikes and participate in 
boycotts. The WVS does not explicitly reference specific boycotts and/or strikes in its 
questionnaires; therefore, we assume that the respondents are indicating their overall 
participation in these two types of activity based on a general understanding of boycotts and 
strikes. Boycotts are assumed to be seen as an act to withdraw support for an organization or an 
institution by removing ties or relations. Strikes are assumed to be understood as work stoppages 
that are used against employers to gain bargaining power. Our index of unconventional 
participation is created by taking the average of responses to questions concerning the 
respondents’ propensity to join boycotts and strikes. In both cases, the possible responses to the 
questions range from 1 = would never do to 3 = have done. Table 3 reports the summary of 
descriptive statistics on these dependent variables as well as all independent variables. All four 
of the dependent variables analyzed here range in value from 1 to 3, with 3 always indicating 
more participation. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
National-Level Variables 
Our main variable of interest is the proportion of female ministers in the cabinet, which we take 
from Krook and O’Brien’s cabinet data collected in 2009, one year prior to the fielding of the 
WVS.5 The proportion, with a scale of 0 to 1, indicates the proportion of all ministers in the 
cabinet who are female. Women’s representation in the cabinet varies considerably, ranging from 
5% of women in Pakistan and Ukraine to 48% in Sweden. In order to directly test and compare 
the effects of female ministers with those of female legislators, we also include a measure of the 
proportion of women in the legislature, obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 2009 
report of the percentage of women in lower houses—the same year that Krook and O’Brien’s 
 cabinet data were collected. We then adjust this variable into a proportion, on a scale of 0 to 1, in 
order to maintain consistency with the measure of female ministers. We control for women’s 
presence in parliament, particularly because one might expect that representation in the cabinet 
would be affected by the presence of women in legislature (Davis 1997). 
In choosing the other covariates, we generally try to model our analysis after Wolbrecht 
and Campbell (2007), employing the same national-level controls in our analysis. We do not 
include dummies for the Scandinavian countries and the former communist states in Eastern 
Europe because variation is insufficient; only Poland and Sweden fall under these categories. 
Nonetheless, we realize the importance of cultural acceptance toward women as political 
executives and suspect that having a female prime minister or president might also carry role 
model effects apart from the gender diversity of the cabinet. Therefore, we control for the gender 
of the head of the state in 2009. Chile, Germany, and Ukraine are the three cases in our dataset 
that have either a female prime minister or female president during 2009. 
We anticipate that cultural acceptance of women in politics is also important (Caul 2001). 
Because the norm of women in politics (and hence as political representatives) develops over 
time, we measure the number of years up to 2009 that a country had women’s suffrage. We 
collect data on the year that women’s suffrage was passed in each country and subtract that year 
from 2009 to reach the number of years that women have experienced voting rights. As women 
who participate in the labor force are likely to become leaders (Moore and Shackman 1996; 
Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003), we also include the percentage of women in the labor 
force (female labor force), gathered from the World Bank (2009), that examines the percentage 
of women in the population age 15 and older that is economically active in 2009. 
We also control for gender inequality using the United Nations Gender Development 
 Index, as gender inequality might be correlated with women’s representation and participation in 
politics. The Gender Inequality Index reflects gender inequality in three aspects: reproductive 
health, empowerment, and the labor market. The data are compiled from various sources, 
including the maternal mortality ratio from the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and 
educational attainment from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization’s Institute for Statistics. The index closest and prior to the World Values Survey 
fielded in 2010, however, is only available in 2005. Thus, we use this measure as our national-
level indicator of the state of women’s disadvantages.6 
As Inglehart and Norris (2003) suggest that development and cultural transformation play 
an important role in shaping gender attitudes, we create a variable to represent national gender 
ideology by taking the national average of an index of two questions that ask respondents how 
they perceive women’s roles. Participants in the survey are asked to respond on a scale of 1 = 
agree strongly to 4 = strongly disagree to the following two statements: (1) “On the whole, men 
make better political leaders than women do,” and (2) “A university education is more important 
for a boy than for a girl.”7 These questions resemble the gender ideology questions in the three 
surveys—Civic Education Study (1999–2000), European Education Study (1999–2002), and 
European Social Survey (2004)—used in Wolbrecht and Campbell’s (2007) study. 
In addition to gender-related measures, we also control for other national-level variables 
that might exert influence on the proportion of female cabinet members. First, the type of 
electoral system is found to influence the level of descriptive representation of women 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Lijphart 2012). Particularly, proportional representation systems 
are found to be more women friendly, as women are more likely to be represented in party lists 
(Bogdanor 1992; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Matland and Studlar 1996). Therefore, we use 
 Golder’s (2005) measure of legislative type to indicate each country’s electoral system. 
Countries are recoded as 0 for having a majoritarian system, 1 for having a mixed system, and 2 
for having a proportional representation system. Additionally, we include each country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2009, collected from the World Bank (2009), as a control 
because a country’s economic development may influence the resources available for individuals 
to participate in political activity (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1990, 1997). 
 
Individual-Level Variables 
On the individual level, we also utilize similar variables to Wolbrecht and Campbell’s (2007) 
models.8 Important for the analysis that follows is the respondents’ sex (female = 1). Our 
hypotheses revolve around the influence of female ministers on women’s political participation, 
so we interact female with the proportion of female ministers. We control for the educational 
background of the respondent to indicate a person’s socioeconomic status. Respondents are 
asked about the highest-level of education they have attained, ranging from 1 = no formal 
education to 9 = university-level education, with degree. We also control for the respondents’ 
marital status, as personal biography has been found as an important factor in whether and how 
an individual behaves politically (McAdam 1986, 1992). Additionally, we control for whether 
the respondent is employed, as employment and networks derived from the workplace increase 
the likelihood that individuals will be recruited into political activity (Schlozman, Burns, and 
Verba 1999; Welch 1977). Employed respondents are coded 1. Finally, we control for the 
respondent’s age. 
As the respondents are sampled within different countries, we utilize a two-level model, 
employing multilevel modeling techniques to account for the clustered nature of the data by 
 allowing the intercept to vary randomly across nations (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). We also 
employ a cross-level interaction term—whether the respondent is female times the proportion of 
female ministers—to examine the role model effect on women. We express our model here: 
 
= β0 + β1 (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖) + β2 (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖) + β3 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) + β4 (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖) +  
β5 (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖) + ei 
β0 = γ00 + γ01 (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗) + γ02 (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑗) + γ03 (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗) +  
γ04 (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑗) + γ05 (𝑆𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗) + γ06 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑗) + γ07 
(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑗) + γ08(𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗)+ μ0 
 
Our cross-level interaction in the model between the sex of the respondent and the proportion of 
women in the cabinet is introduced as following: 
β1 = γ10 + γ11 (Female Ministers) + μ1 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our modeling strategy follows our categorization of political participation into multiple modes. 
Table 4 presents the multilevel models for four dependent variables, each of which represents a 
different form of political participation. Partial models and several robustness checks are 
provided in the online appendix. We start by noting that although the previous literature found 
that women’s legislative representation shapes women’s political activity (Barnes and Buchard 
2012; Norris and Krook 2009; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), the variable representing 
women’s legislative representation is insignificant for all four measures of participation. We 
expect that the reason for the different findings is that we control for the proportion of women in 
 the cabinet. Because of the potentially higher visibility of female ministers, we expected that 
female ministers would have a greater impact on women’s political participation. When both 
variables are included in the model, women’s legislative representation does not have a 
significant effect on any of the forms of political participation.9 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our hypotheses suggest that the effect of women’s representation in the cabinet on 
women citizens’ political participation differs depending on the specific type of political 
participation, with types varying in costs in time and effort, ease of access and collaboration, and 
connections to electoral institutions. As expected, the results in Table 4 show that the effect of 
female ministers on women’s involvement in politics differs depending on the type of 
participation. The cross-level interaction of being female with the proportion of women in the 
cabinet is the variable which captures this effect. This variable is significant and in the expected 
direction for conventional participation, petition signing, and participation in demonstrations but 
not for unconventional participation. When female ministers are present, women partake in 
political actions that are low in cost or closely connected to electoral institutions but not in 
strikes or boycotts—types of participation that are both more costly to participate in and less 
connected to electoral politics. 
We have two conflicting hypotheses about the effects of female ministers on women’s 
willingness to engage in peaceful demonstrations. On the one hand, we expect female citizens to 
no longer need unconventional outlets to express their opinions when women serve as ministers. 
On the other hand, we hypothesize that as peaceful demonstrations become more accepted, their 
connection to electoral institutions increases, strengthening the role model effect of female 
cabinet members. Our analysis confirms that the role model effect is strong for participation in 
 demonstrations. The presence of women in the cabinet has a significant positive impact on 
women’s willingness to protest peacefully. 
While we find female ministers to be role models for women to partake in actions that are 
low (and lower) in cost and related to electoral institutions in which female ministers also 
partake, we also find that they have less of an impact on women’s behavior that carries great 
risk. Model 4 illustrates support for our hypothesis (H4) that women’s representation in 
ministerial positions will have no effect on women’s unconventional, risky protest behavior. The 
coefficient for the interaction of female with the proportion of women in the parliament is 
insignificant (p > .10). We do not find this surprising, as boycotting and joining strikes tend to be 
confrontational and illegal; it is rare to see female ministers partaking in such controversial 
actions. Consequently, women in the cabinet are not likely to serve as role models to other 
women to engage in this type of behavior. In sum, H1, H2, H3b, and H4 are supported, while H3a 
is rejected. 
While we had no hypotheses about the control variables, we note that the individual-level 
variables are in the expected direction. Education and employment increase all types of women’s 
political participation, while the effects of marriage and age vary depending on the type of 
participation, with older and married people less likely to participate in unconventional 
participation. Most of the national-level variables do not consistently reach statistical 
significance. In addition to the proportion of women in parliament and the cross-level 
interaction, only electoral system achieves significance across a number of models. While 
electoral systems had no effect on conventional participation, women are significantly less likely 
to engage in petition signing, demonstrations, strikes, or boycotts in countries with proportional 
representation systems. 
 To better understand the strength of the effect that women cabinet members have on the 
various forms of women’s political participation, Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the strength of the 
role model effects from the analyses in Models 1–3 in Table 4.10 The figures are generated in 
marginsplot, which graphs the results from estimated margins, illustrating the predicted values 
for female and male respondents’ participation in conventional politics, petition signing, and 
peaceful demonstrations across different proportions of women in the cabinet in order to help 
understand the substantive effects of our interaction term.11 
Figure 1 shows that when 5% of the cabinet is made up of women, men are, on average, 
0.04 point higher than women on our measure of conventional political participation. However, 
the gender gap begins to decrease and women are increasingly more likely to engage in 
conventional political action as the presence of female ministers rises. Female citizens’ 
likelihood of voting and becoming members of political parties is essentially equal to men’s 
when cabinets are 48% women, which is the highest level of women’s representation in our 
sample of countries. Most importantly, women’s propensity to vote or obtain party membership 
increases 0.16 point on our three-point index—or almost 0.4 standard deviation—as women’s 
ministerial representation rises from 0.05 to 0.48. Thus, there is evidence that female ministers 
serve as role models in inspiring women to engage in conventional politics. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 illustrates that men are, on average, more likely to sign petitions than women. 
When the cabinet is made up of 5% women, men are 0.07 point on the three-point scale more 
likely to claim that they have signed petitions. The gap between women’s and men’s propensities 
for petition signing continues to narrow as women’s representation in the cabinet increases. 
However, women’s willingness to say that they have signed petitions remains less than men’s 
 even where the proportion of women in the cabinet reaches the maximum level (0.48) among the 
countries included in our sample, although when women reach the maximum in the cabinet, the 
difference between men and women is slight (0.02 point on our three-point scale). Women’s 
propensity to sign petition increases 0.39 point—or 0.48 standard deviation—as the proportion of 
women in the cabinet rises from 0.05 to 0.48. This result suggests that women’s presence in the 
cabinet increases female citizens’ willingness to sign petitions. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Even greater differences between men and women’s political participation exist on the 
willingness the engage in peaceful protest. Figure 3 shows that when 5% of the cabinet ministers 
are women, men are predicted to attend peaceful demonstrations 0.15 point more on average than 
women. The gender gap narrows as the proportion of female cabinet ministers rises. When 
female cabinet members’ presence reaches 48%, men are still more likely to attend peaceful 
demonstrations than women, but only about 0.05 point higher than the average propensity of 
women. Women’s predicted probability to demonstrate increases 0.43 point—or more than 0.6 
standard deviation—as the proportion of women in the cabinet rises from 0.05 to 0.48. Figure 3 
suggests that women ministers influence women’s attendance at demonstrations. Given our 
conflicting hypotheses about demonstrating, we argue that this finding suggests that peacefully 
demonstrating is a form of political participation that is closer in cost and connection to “normal” 
political participation than it is difficult and unconventional in nature. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Together, although the effects are not large, the figures suggest that as political action 
becomes more risky, more costly, more conflictual, less connected to electoral institutions, and 
requires more collective effort, the gap between men and women increases and is less affected by 
 the presence of women as ministers. Even when women’s representation in the cabinet almost 
reaches parity with men, gender gaps in participation persist. Gender differences are more likely 
to disappear if the form of political activity is more connected to conventional politics, such as 
voting and becoming political party members, than when it consists of actions less connected to 
electoral activity, such as protesting or signing petitions. For strikes and boycotts, which are far 




This project makes several contributions to our understanding of individuals’ civic engagement 
and the role that representation plays in encouraging it. First, while the importance of women 
serving in the legislature has been examined in previous studies, how female ministers might 
serve as role models has traditionally been underexplored. This article fills the gap in extant 
studies by theorizing the differences between women’s representation in the cabinet and in the 
legislature and examining how those two forms of women’s representation influence citizens’ 
political activity. Current findings show that women legislators act as role models in inspiring 
women to run for office, expressing political interest, engaging in political discussions, and 
participating in political activity (Atkeson 2003; Fox and Lawless 2014; Wolbrecht and 
Campbell 2007). We find that women ministers also have similar role model effects in 
encouraging women to engage in politics. While our findings for female cabinet members mirror 
those for female legislators, our results indicate that women’s ministerial representation plays a 
more significant role than that of their counterparts in the legislature. Nonetheless, women’s 
representation in the cabinet is an understudied area of the literature on women’s representation. 
 Moreover, our study cannot speak to the role that women in other places in politics, such as 
women bureaucrats or women judges, play in influencing women citizens. We do not yet know 
to what extent women citizens might look to these other political institutions for role models. 
Second, we focus on analyzing differences among multiple modes of political 
participation, which we categorize based on the costs, risks, and relationship to electoral 
institutions. The role model effect for female cabinet members varies depending on whether we 
examine on women’s participation as voters and party members, petition signers, peaceful 
demonstrators, or participants in strikes and boycotts. Female ministers are found to have a 
significant impact on behaviors targeted at electoral institutions and that are low in cost. That is, 
the role model effect occurs mostly when female ministers inspire women to participate in ways 
that most resemble the behavior of female ministers. As female ministers work within and also 
might be seen as the embodiment of electoral institutions, they appear to encourage women to 
seek similar outlets to express their political opinion (e.g., through voting, joining parties, and 
even signing petitions and demonstrating). Our analysis further illustrates that women have 
different responses when seeing women in cabinet, depending on the costs, risks, and ease of 
access of each type of participation. Few studies differentiate political actions along these 
dimensions but our results suggest that the causes of different types of political behavior are 
likely to vary depending on the role that costs, risks and connection to electoral politics play in 
the causal mechanisms. All this suggests that future explorations of political behavior should 
incorporate these factors into their analysis. 
The fact that the effect of women’s ministerial representation differs depending on the 
form of participation implies that there may be limits to the role model effect. The measures we 
use to operationalize political participation are still conventional. Other mechanisms of political 
 action exist at various levels, such as organizing communities, running for office, donating 
money to candidates, occupying, writing on blogs, and mobilizing on social media sites. Yet 
most current research and our study are unable to address these untraditional and informal 
notions of participation because of the limitations of existing cross-national public opinion data. 
Extending the survey instruments to include these additional forms of participation is necessary 
to examine the role that women politicians may play in influencing these other forms of political 
participation. This question is particularly important because women’s political activity is often 
constrained by their biographical availability, such as time, domestic, and work commitments, 
suggesting that women may be more active in less conventional forms of political participation. 
Not only does overlooking this aspect miss major arenas in which women may be politically 
active, but if women are more likely to engage in such activities, it may give an erroneous 
impression that women’s participation in politics is unequal to men’s (Lister 2003). 
Additionally, the inspirational effect lessens when women are faced with participation 
that requires more effort and sacrifice. As our study differentiates the ease and political 
effectiveness of civic engagement, it also raises the question of whether female ministers might 
ever inspire women in aspects of civic engagement that pose risks or are dangerous. This 
question is important as scholars often debate the meaning and effectiveness of civic 
engagement—if participation such as voting and joining political parties does not drastically 
change politics, it may be that more risky or confrontational behavior is necessary. However, 
these are also the forms of civic engagement that women are least likely to employ. We do not 
yet understand well what leads women to engage in such acts nor whether female politicians play 
a role in inspiring action under these extreme circumstances. 
Lastly, our data represent a cross-section of a specific time point. While we use the most 
 up-to-date dataset to cross-nationally examine the relationship between women’s representation 
in the cabinet and forms of political participation, we do not know whether the effects are 
constant over time. Indeed, we discuss reasons, such as the rise of internet activism, why the 
effect might change over time. Other dynamic effects might also exist. For example, as women 
habitually are found in these positions of political power, it may be that their effect as role 
models diminishes, particularly if they are identified less by gender or if gender roles shift as a 
result of their increased representation. This suggests the necessity of a close examination of how 
role model effect works at different points in time. As this research differentiates between 
women’s leadership in the legislatures and in the cabinets, we hope it will also open the door to 
future research on how women political leaders matter as new generations of women 
increasingly participate in political activities. 
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MPs Armenia 2 11 0.11 12 9 0.09 
Australia 13 42 0.42 41 27 0.27 
Chile 9 43 0.43 17 14 0.14 
Colombia 3 23 0.23 14 8 0.08 
Estonia 2 15 0.15 23 23 0.23 
Germany 6 40 0.40 204 33 0.33 
Japan 2 11 0.11 54 11 0.11 
Mexico 2 11 0.11 138 28 0.28 
Netherlands 11 39 0.39 63 42 0.42 
New Zealand 16 31 0.21 41 34 0.34 
Pakistan 2 5 0.05 76 22 0.22 
Peru 6 38 0.38 33 28 0.28 
Poland 5 29 0.29 92 20 0.20 
Spain 8 47 0.47 128 37 0.37 




7 30 0.30 11 27 0.27 
Turkey 1 7 0.07 50 9 0.09 




5 26 0.26 73 17 0.17 
Uruguay 3 25 0.25 14 14 0.14 










 Table 2 Mapping the difficulty and cost level and electoral connections of various forms of political 
participation 
 
Least difficult   Most difficult 
most connected with   Least connected with 
electoral institutions   Electoral institutions 




  (boycotts + strikes) 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of descriptive statistics of all national-level and individual-level variables in all countries 
examined 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Female 28,955 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Age 28,938 46.49 17.68 17 98 
Education 28,359 5.95 2.28 1 9 
Employed 29,730 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Married 28,804 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Political knowledge 27,019 3.46 0.89 1 5 
Electoral system 28.960 1.30 0.77 0 2 
Female labor participation 28.960 42.39 6.86 20.31 49.62 
GDP per capita 28,960 22.93 17.37 0.95 48.00 
Suffrage 28,960 78.39 15.23 54 107 
Gender ideology 28,960 2.39 0.22 1.68 2.61 
Gender inequality index 28,960 0.29 0.16 0.07 0.61 
% left party 20,939 36.18 29.95 0 94.69 
Female head of state 28,960 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Proportion of women 
in parliament 
28,960 0.23 0.11 0.08 0.46 
Proportion of women in cabinet 28,960 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.48 
Female * proportion of women 
in cabinet 
28,954 0.13 0.16 0 0.48 
 Conventional participation 28,392 1.85 0.42 1 3 
Petition signing 27,892 1.99 0.82 1 3 
Demonstration 27,696 1.69 0.71 1 3 
Unconventional participation 27,963 1.50 0.57 1 3 
 Table 4 Influence of proportion of women in the cabinet on various forms of women’s political participation 
 





Petition -signing Demonstration Unconventio
nal 
participation 
Individual level Variables     
Female (= 1) -0.03 -0.03* -0.14*** -0.09*** 
 (0.010)*** (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) 
Age 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.000** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employed (= 1) 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) 
Married 0.07*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
National-Level Variables     
Electoral system -0.01 -0.17** -0.11*** -0.07* 
 (0.027) (0.061) (0.026) (0.031) 
Female labor participation 0.00 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01* 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.01* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suffrage (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gender ideology 0.15 0.46 0.45** 0.15 
 (0.142) (0.326) (0.140) (0.164) 
Gender inequality index 0.72** -0.09 -0.25 0.20 
 (0.292) (0.670) (0.288) (0.338) 
 Female head of state (=1) -0.07 -0.19* 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.049) (0.670) (0.002) (0.057) 
Prop. women in parliament -0.05 0.18 0.33 0.39 
 (0.237) (0.543) (0.234) (0.274) 
Prop women in cabinet 0.29 0.79** 0.74*** 0.74** 
 (0.203) (0.465) (0.201) (0.235) 
Female * women in cabinet 0.00*** 0.11* 0.25*** 0.01 
 (0.000) (0.059) (0.058) (0.044) 
Constant 0.52 0.50 0.84 0.80** 
 (0.336) (0.770) (0.330) (0.388) 
Observations 27,593 27,083 26,911 27,173 
Number of groups 20 20 20 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Figure 1 Effect of the proportion of female cabinet ministers on women’s and men’s conventional political participation 
 
Figure 2 Effect of the proportion of female cabinet ministers on women’s and men’s participation in petition signing 
 
Figure 3 Effect of the proportion of female cabinet ministers on women’s and men’s participation in demonstration 
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Table 5 The influence of % women in the cabinet on political participation of female citizens with % left of the 
government included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Conventional Petition signing Demonstration Unconventional 
Female (=1) -0.00 -0.02 -0.09*** -0.06*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) 
Age 0.07*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employed (=1) 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
Married 0.06*** 0.03** -0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Electoral system -0.05** -0.23*** -0.10*** -0.04*** 
 (0.019) (0.003) (0.014) (0.010) 
Female labor participation -0.00 -0.03*** -0.01** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
GDP per capita -0.00 -0.00** -0.01*** 0.00** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Suffrage (years) -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender ideology -0.34** -1.58*** 0.29** -1.05*** 
 (0.153) (0.106) (0.121) (0.083) 
Gender inequality index 0.87*** 1.11*** -0.02 1.13*** 
 (0.229) (0.150) (0.175) (0.118) 
% Left 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00* -0.00*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female head of state (=1) 0.03 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.02 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.025) (0.017) 
Prop. women in parliament 0.40*** 2.37*** -12 1.18*** 
 (0.199) (0.140) (0.160) (0.109) 
Prop. women in cabinet 0.75*** 2.54*** 1.68*** 1.91*** 
 (0.242) (0.161) (0.186) (0.126) 
Female * % women in cabinet 0.01 0.11* 0.18** -0.07 
 (0.038) (0.065) (0.064) (0.050) 
Constant 1.81*** 3.83*** 1.06*** 2.36*** 
 (0.289) (0.185) (0.218) (0.146) 
Observations 19,742 19,382 19,158 19,353 
Number of groups 13 13 13 13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.010, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6 Influence of % women in the cabinet on political participation of female citizens 
with individuals’ political knowledge included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Conventional Petition -signing Demonstration Unconventional 
Female (=1) -0.02* -0.02 -0.13*** -0.08*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
Age 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employed (=1) 0.05*** 0.06** 0.02** 0.04*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Married 0.06*** 0.15 -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Political knowledge 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Electoral system -0.01 -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.07** 
 (0.029) (0.056) (0.025) (0.031) 
Female labor participation 0.00 -0.02 -0.01** -0.01 
 (0.005) (0.0009) (0.004) (0.005) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suffrage (years) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Gender ideology 0.10 0.39 0.36** 0.10 
 (0.155) (0.297) (0.133) (0.166) 
Gender inequality index 0.80** -0.20 0.04 0.31 
 (0.330) (0.630) (0.282) (0.352) 
Female head of state (=1) -0.08 -0.24** 0.01 -0.09 
 (0.054) (0.104) (0.046) (0.058) 
Prop. women in parliament -0.11 0.04 0.28 0.35 
 (0.259) (0.495) (0.222) (0.276) 
Prop. women in cabinet 0.32 0.96** 0.66*** 0.72*** 
 (0.226) (0.432) (0.195) (0.241) 
Female * % women in cabinet 0.08** 0.09 0.25*** -0.00 
 (0.035) (0.062) (0.061) (0.046) 
Constant 0.41 0.51 0.55 0.67 
 (0.373) (0.714) (0.318) (0.398) 
Observations 25,899 25,428 25,269 25,515 
Number of groups 19 19 19 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.010, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 Table 7 Baseline Models for the Influence of % Women in the Cabinet on Various Forms of Political Participation of 
all Citizens 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Conventional Petition -signing Demonstration Unconventional 
Female (=1) -0.00 -0.00 -0.08*** -0.10*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
Age 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employed (=1) 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Married 0.07*** 0.03** -0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Electoral system -0.01 -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.07 
 (0.026) (0.061) (0.026) (0.031) 
Female labor participation 0.00 -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.01* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Suffrage (years) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0024) 
Gender ideology 0.16 0.46 0.45*** 0.150 
 (0.142) (0.326) (0.140) (0.164) 
Gender inequality index 0.71** -0.09 -0.25 0.20 
 (0.292) (0.671) (0.289) (0.338) 
Female head of state (=1) -0.07 -0.19* 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.049) (0.112) (0.048) (0.057) 
 Prop. women in parliament -0.05 0.18 0.33* 0.39 
 (0.237) (0.543) (0.235) (0.274) 
Prop. women in cabinet 0.34 0.85 0.87*** 0.74*** 
 (0.202) (0.465) (0.200) (0.234) 
Constant 0.51 0.48 0.81** 0.80** 
 (0.335) (0.771) (0.331) (0.388) 
Observations 27,593 27,083 26,911 27,173 
Number of groups 20 20 20 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.010, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
  
1 Dalton (2008) classified petition signing as unconventional political action. 
 
2 Data and documentation can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp 
3 The nature of the survey questionnaire is such that we cannot know the specific demonstrations in which the respondents participated. 
4 Given the nature of the WVS, which asks general questions about the respondents’ propensity to participate in general forms of 
petition signing and peaceful demonstrations, we are unable to identify the specific details of these actions. In other words, we know 
whether respondents participated and (occasionally) the frequency of their engagement, but we do not know the types of petitions that 
they have signed or the targets or goals of the demonstrations in which they participated. Current cross-national surveys are 
insufficient to address how women’s political representation influences the focus of women’s petition signing or demonstrating. 
Moreover, we cannot know how the subjects, goals, and missions of women’s petitioning or protesting differ. Hence, examining the 
gaps in participation on political actions that have varying targets and goals is beyond the ability of this study. Future data collection 
and research are necessary to address these questions. 
5 To ensure that the effects of women’s presence politics are easily interpreted, we use the proportion of women’s representation instead 
of the percentage of women in either legislature or cabinet. This variable ranges from 0 to 1. 
6 While this indicator is collected in 2005, which is different from the time period that the other national-level variables are collected, 
the indicator does not change much in the course of four years (between 2005 and 2009). Countries that have a low Gender Inequality 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Index remain low, while the countries that have a high Gender Inequality Index remain high. As the variation is consistent over time, 
this should not influence our analysis. 
7 Although Paxton and Kunovich (2003) suggest there are other questions that could potentially be included to gauge gender 
attitudes, as, we chose questions that relate to women’s roles as political leaders rather than questions about the private sphere, such 
as whether being a housewife or a working mother is equally fulfilling and rewarding. 
8 We are unable to include the number of books individuals have at home because this question is not asked in the WVS. Because 
we employ a multilevel approach, omitted individual level variables do not alter the effects of the national-level indicators, which 
are of primary interest. However, we do note that one’s political knowledge might also shape how aware a respondent is of the 
proportion of women cabinet ministers in their countries. Thus, we replicate our analysis including participants’ political 
knowledge, which is measured by the amount of news consumption respondents have. This necessitates leaving Morocco out of our 
dataset. See Table 6 in the online appendix for detailed results. 
9 Table 7 in the online appendix shows that without the interaction term, women in the legislatures do not influence individuals’ 
engagement in conventional politics, petition signing, and unconventional politics. Women in parliament are only found to affect 
individuals’ participation in peaceful demonstrations. On the contrary, women in the cabinet are shown to affect individuals’ 
participation in petition-signing and unconventional political actions when the interaction term is excluded. 
10 We do not create a figure for unconventional participation since the variable of interest shows no effect in this case. 
11 All other variables are held at their mean values. 
